Vagrancy: Loitering as Definitional Conduct in Oklahoma by Van Walraven, Joseph
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 8 Issue 1 
Spring 1972 
Vagrancy: Loitering as Definitional Conduct in Oklahoma 
Joseph Van Walraven 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph Van Walraven, Vagrancy: Loitering as Definitional Conduct in Oklahoma, 8 Tulsa L. J. 74 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss1/4 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
are contained to and espoused as beliefs, and there is no indi-
cation of an applicant being unfit to practice law, then he
must be granted a license to practice. The subjective standards
must be made as objective as possible for the protection of
the minority and the furtherance of our form of government.
John S. Turner
VAGRANCY: LOITERING AS DEFINITIONAL
CONDUCT IN OKLAHOMA
The concept of vagrancy dates back to the feudal period
when social and economic changes, "coupled with the acute
labor shortage following the Black Death, prompted Parlia-
ment ... to pass the Statute of Labourers"' which attempted
to provide a labor supply for hard pressed landowners by
declaring wandering a crime. Today, while the historical rea-
sons for vagrancy have become clouded, most jurisdictions
in the United States adhere to the vagrancy concept as a
method of enforcing the prevailing social values against the
individual and as an "end run" around the fourth and fifth
amendment rights of the individual.2
1 Comment, The Vagrancy Concept Reconsidered: Problems
and Abuses of Status Criminality, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 102, 104
(1962) [hereinafter cited as Vagrancy Reconsidered].
2 See Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the
Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Ob-
noxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police Officers, and the
Like, 3 Cmnw. L. BULL. 205 (1967); Douglas, Vagrancy and
Arrest of Suspicion, 70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); Foote, Vagrancy-
Type Law and its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603
(1956); Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal
Conditions, 77 HAuv. L. REV. 1203 (1953); McKay, Poverty
and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 35 U. CoLo. L.
REV. 323 (1963); Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues a n d Vaga-
bonds-Old Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CALin. L. REV.
557 (1960); Comment, Constitutional Attacks on Vagrancy
[V"ol. 8, No. I
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Vagrancy has been defined as "status criminality"s or "in
terms of being rather than in terms of acting.' 4 (emphasis
added) Thus, vagrancy results in the total absence of the "ele-
ments of a crime, act and intent."5 The obvious conclusion is
that vagrancy suffers numerous infirmities. Many commenta-
tors feel that vagrancy violates due process, equal protection,
free association, freedom of movement, fourth an d fifth
amendment guarantees, and the right of privacy, let alone
being an anachronistic throwback to the days of yore which
has no rational relation to the social, legal, economic, and
political realities of the modern world.7 In recognition of the
above constitutional arguments, and following the trend in
other jurisdictions, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
in Hayes v. Municipal Court of Oklahoma City8 declared three
provisions of Oklahoma City's vagrancy ordinance9 in viola-
tion of the state and federal constitution.
Laws, 20 STAN. L. REv. 782 (1968); Vagrancy Reconsidered,
supa note 1; Comment, Vagrancy and Related Offenses,
4 HARv. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 291 (1968-69). But
see Perkins, The Vagrancy Concept, 9 HAsTwi s L.J. 237
(1958).
3 Vagrancy Reconsidered, supra note 1, at 106.
4 Lacy, supra note 2, at 1204.
' Sherry, supra note 2, at 556.
o See authorities cited, note 2.
' Sherry, supra note 2, at 560.
8 487 P.2d 974 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
' OKLAHoMA Crry, OKLA., CODE tit. 9, ch. 8 §§ 9.8.01-.03:
Sec. 9.8.01: First: An idle person who lives without income
or who has no visible support and makes
no exertion to obtain a livelihood by
honest employment.
Second: Any person who strolls or loiters idly
about the streets of said city, having no
local habitation and no honest business
or employment. (emphasis added)
Sec. 9.8.02: It shall be unlawful and an offense, between
the hours of 12 O'clock midnight and the sun-
rising hour hereafter, for any person to loiter
or wander aimlessly upon or (sic) about the
19721
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In earlier cases, the court tended to reverse vagrancy con-
victions on insufficiency of evidence or no probable cause for
arrest. The court in Lucas v. State10 and Huff v. State" stated
that the purpose for vagrancy statutes was to eliminate the
tendency of idlers to commit crimes which result from the
individual being without employment or visible means of sup-
port. Both cases, however, held that in order to convict one
of vagrancy the state must bring the actions of the defendant
clearly within the statute; anything less would be insufficient.
In Rainbolt v. State12 the court reversed a conviction for pos-
session of marihuana. A search and seizure was sought to be
justified on the defendant's alleged violation of the Oklahoma
City vagrancy ordinance. The reversal was based not on the
unconstitutionality of the ordinance but on the ground that
the "suspicious" manner of the defendant did not amount to
probable cause; therefore, such an arrest was a violation of
the individual's constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.'3 More recently, the court in Graham
streets, or alleys, or other public highways, or
parks of said city, or upon private lots, around
vacant or occupied buildings or railway prop-
erty, or yards, who has not a lawful reason for
being at such place at such time, or to sleep
in or about such place, or within any place, or
upon any bench or chair provided for public
accommodation, without lawful authority or
permission to do so. (emphasis added)
Sec. 9.8.03: It shall be unlawful and an offense for any
person under sixteen years of age to loaf or
loiter on the streets or alleys or other public
places or commons in the city between nine
O'clock p.m. and six O'clock a.m. (emphasis
added)
See also OKLA. STAT. Am. tit. 21, § 1141 (1961).
10 31 Okla. Crim. 297, 238 P. 502 (1925).
" 34 Okla. Crim. 261, 246 P. 496 (1926).
12 97 Okla. Crim. 164, 260 P.2d 426 (1953).
13 Id. at 428-29.
[Vol. 8, No. I
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v. State14 reversed a conviction for possession of gambling
paraphernalia and a concealed weapon which were seized dur-
ing an alleged vagrancy violation similar to Rainbolt, but here
the court assumed a stricter stance toward such use of the
vagrancy ordinances. The court held that the vagrancy could
not be used as a subterfuge to justify the admission of evi-
dence obtained in a subsequent search.15 Thus, where there
is no apparent offense, vagrancy may not be used as a catch-
all by which individuals are searched. This decision, again,
was based on lack of probable cause. However, the court rec-
ognized that vagrancy ordinances have been held to be un-
constitutional in other jurisdictions. 16 The stage was now set
to test the constitutionality of vagrancy in Oklahoma.
The conduct sought to be prohibited in most vagrancy
statutes is loitering or wandering.7 Noting the numerous defi-
nitions of the term loiter, the court in Hayes held it uncon-
stitutionally vague "as used.""' This vagueness of loitering,
as to what conduct is proscribed, places the citizen in the un-
tenable position of not having fair notice whether or not his
conduct will subject him to criminal liability. Consequently,
where there are no discernable standards available, due proc-
14 447 P.2d 200 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
1' Id. at 203, 204.
16 Id. at 204.
17 The statutory term of vagrancy, probably because of its
unfavorable connotation, has been increasingly replaced
with such terms as disorderly conduct and loitering. While
the change of nomenclature may appear significant, many
of the provisions of the old vagrancy statutes are retained.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647 (West Supp. 1967) (disorderly
conduct); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 240.35 (McKinney 1967) (loit-
ering).
18 487 P.2d at 977. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S.




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 8 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol8/iss1/4
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
ess is violated; thus invalidating the statute.'9 Moreover,
loitering per se is not criminal conduct; the word does not
denote any sinister or wrongful activity.20 Merely walking or
,standing on a public street at an unusual or late hour does
not, without more,21 impart criminal intent or activity.
The criterion in the Oklahoma City ordinance requiring
the individual to have a lawful reason 22 for his presence was
considered by Hayes to be equally vague and even more of-
fensive by placing the burden of establishing innocence up-
on the suspect.23 This uncertain standard of what is or is not
a lawful reason places too much discretion in the hands. of
the police. Without statutory guidelines to follow, what may
be a plausible excuse to one officer or judge may not be suf-
ficient to another.2 4 More importantly, "the citizen has no way
of knowing until after his arrest if he had a lawful reason
for being on the street."2 That the suspect must furnish a
19 487 P.2d at 976. The leading case in this area is Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), wherein the Court held
that since there was neither statutory definition nor court
interpretation of the term "gang", the result was a lack of
certainty, requiring one to speculate as to the meaning of
the statute, which violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See also Conally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
20 Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F.2d 171, 173 (9th Cir. 1931).
21 The commission of further conduct may, in and of itself,
give rise to probable cause or reasonable suspicion enabling
the officer to take more affirmative measures. See Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). But any such instance would probably lead
to an arrest for the "actual" crime rather than a mere va-
grancy violation.
22 See supra, note 9.
2 487 P.2d at 977.
24 Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1104 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); Arnold v. City and Co. of Denver, 464 P.2d 515,
517 (Colo. 1970).
25 487 P.2d at 977.
[Vol. 8, No, I
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lawful reason for his presence fares no better in light of the
fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. Here the
suspect faces a dilemma: if he waives the fifth amendment,
the suspect faces arrest by virtue of an inadequate excuse or
he may invoke his fifth amendment privilege and face in-
carceration for his refusal to furnish an answer-such a re-
sult is clearly in violation of the fifth amendment.28
The vagueness of loitering cannot be cured by tacking
on an equally vague requirement; to do so merely begs the
question.27 Moreover, Hayes held such statutes that prohibit
the use of public streets, even if within clearly defined time
limits, are unconstitutionally overbroad.28 The inherent vague-
ness of loitering renders it impossible to distinguish between
innocent and criminal activity.29 Thus an individual out for
a midnight stroll would be within the purview of the statute
as well as the prowler casing a neighborhood. Such a result
would "criminalize" innocent behavior.30
There can be no doubt that a governmental unit has police
power to regulate certain forms of conduct on its public
streets; but this power must be directed with sufficient specifi-
city toward the controllable conduct and may not cut such a
20 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964); State v. Grahovac, 480 P.2d
148, 152-53 (Hawaii 1971). In Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965) the Court stated that the prosecutor can-
not comment to the jury upon the defendant's silence dur-
ing the trial. While the suspect in a vagrancy arrest does
not face a jury directly, the officer in effect is the judge
and jury passing on the- credibility of the suspect's excuse
or lack of an excuse at the time of arrest.
27 Scott v. District Attorney, Jefferson Parish, 309 F. Supp.
833, 837 (E.D. La. 1970).
28 487 P.2d at 978.
29 Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1104 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
80 Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266, 272 (S.D. Fla. 1969).
1972]
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wide swath that the regulation violates a protected freedom. 1
Relying on this concept, Hayes held that loitering "is in and
of itself neither immoral or anti-social" 32 and, by prohibiting
the non-criminal use of the public streets, the individual's
right of privacy and freedom of movement is violated. 3
Basically, the most favorable aspect for police officers of
vagrancy laws is their vagueness.34 Through vagrancy statutes
the work of the police is greatly facilitated. Instead of waiting
for probable cause or reasonable suspicion to arise, the of-
ficer is able to stop the suspected criminal before he has a
chance to commit a crime. Thus, vagrancy has been described
as one of the "most effective weapons in the arsenal of law
enforcement."3 5 Hayes rejects this rationale. The use of this
"weapon", by its very nature, demands arrest on mere sus-
picion and police discretion. And "no matter how useful the
legislation may be"36 if it infringes or restricts personal free-
doms and guarantees under the constitution, then that legis-
lation must fail.37 Police methods must be subservient to in-
dividual constitutional guarantees.
In Hayes the court considered loitering, by itself, as not
susceptible to a limited construction, thereby rendering this
term uncertain and ambiguous.88 However, the question re-
31 See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971);
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968); Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967); Adderley v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554
(1965); NAACP v. Alaabma, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); Greg-
ory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118, 124-25 (1969) (Black, J.,
concurring).
32 487 P.2d at 979.
83 Id.
34 Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 219.
35 Perkins, supra note 2, at 252.
386 487 P.2d at 980.
37 Arnold v. City and Co. of Denver, 464 P.2d 515, 517 (Colo.
1970).
38 487 P.2d at 976, quoting Goldman v. Knecht, 295 F.Supp.
897, 901-02 (D. Colo. 1969).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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mains whether loitering and its companion phrases (wander-
ing, strolling, loafing, etc.) may be applied as definitional con-
duct if combined with specific acts3 9 clearly within the state's
police power to prohibit. Even though loitering for the pur-
pose of committing a crime points up that specific unlawful
activity, the term loitering still remains vague.40 Since loiter-
ing has a variety of meanings that escape uniform definition,4 1
one could not be quite sure when a to loiter for the purpose of
19 See N.Y. PENAL CODE § 240.35 (1), (2), (3), (7) (McKinney
1967). Oklahoma City has recently enacted an ordinance
which provides:
No person shall:
(a) Loiter, remain or wander about in a public place
for the purpose of begging;
(b) Loiter, or remain in a public place for the purpose
of gambling with cards, dice or other gambling
paraphernalia;
(c) Loiter or remain in or about a public place for the
purpose of engaging in or soliciting for prostitution
or any act of lewdness.
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLA., CODE ch. 21, art. 1, § 21-8.
40 But see the following cases where loitering, in context of
the statute and the place where prohibited, was held to be
reasonably definite: People v. Pagnotta, 25 N.Y.2d 333, 253
N.E.2d 202, 305 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1969) (loitering for purposes
of using narcotics); People v. Merolla, 9 N.Y.2d 62, 172
N.E.2d 541, 211 N.Y.S.2d 155, cert. denied, 365 U.S. 872 (1961)
(loitering about a waterfront); People v. Johnson, 6 N.Y.2d
549, 161 N.E.2d 9, 190 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1959) (loitering in a
school building). See also People v. Caylor, 6 Cal. App. 3d
51, 85 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Ct. App. 1970); People v. Weger, 251
Cal. App. 2d 584, 59 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1967) cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1047 (1968); People v. Bruno, 211 Cal. App. 2d 855, 27
Cal. Rptr. 458 (Super. Ct. 1962). The above California cases
interpreted the term "loitering", in CAL. PENAL CODE § 647
(e) (West Supp. 1967), in the restricted sense of being in
an area to commit a crime as the opportunity may appear.
The courts stated that the term "loitering" with this re-
stricted interpretation had a reasonably definite connota-
tion.
41 487 P.2d at 976.
1972]
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statute would come into effect. Furthermore, police discretion
would still exist as against whom the statute would be en-
forced; the suspicions of one particular officer at that parti-
cular moment becomes the controlling factor. Overbreadth
would continue; all individuals on the public streets would
be subject to the statute's indiscriminating reach.
Upon analysis, this type of ordinance allows for arrest
on mere suspicion. The offense is loitering for the purpose of
commission of a crime, e.g. gambling. The conduct prohibited,
however, is loitering, not the actual gambling itself. Since the
gambling does not necessarily have to be committed, the police
may make an arrest if they suspect one of loitering for the
purpose of gambling. If no attempt is made toward completion
of the intended act, then no probable cause arises. Conceivably
the arrest would be made for the gambling itself if there were
probable cause. However, under this type of statute, an ar-
rest is made on the lesser charge of loitering for the purpose
of gambling where a case cannot be made for the actual crime
of gambling.42
If the loitering for the purpose of statute is considered
an attempt statute, then the problem of loitering becomes
too remote as preparation emerges. Three elements for an
attempt must be present: intent; performance of some overt
act toward commission; and failure to consummate the crime. 3
Although the intent may well be present, the commission of
some overt act is absent. Preparation alone does not suffice;
something must be done, some step taken beyond preparation
or planning is needed." Mere presence on a public street might
be preparation to perform a crime, but it certainly cannot be
42 Ricks v. District of Columbia, 414 F.2d 1097, 1107-08, n.
67 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 226-27;
Douglas, supra note 2, at 9.
43 Dunbar v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 275, 131 P.2d 116, 122 (1942);
Ervin v. State, 351 P.2d 401 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960); Tay-
lor v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 188, 251 P.2d 523 (1952).
44 Dunbar v. State, 75 Okla. Crim. 275, 131 P.2d 116, 122 (1942).
[Vol. 8, No. I
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considered an overt act.45 To arrest a suspect for loitering
would be to arrest for intent alone. There being no overt act,
the arresting officer must guess as to what intent the suspect
possesses. Hence, arrest on suspicion.
Conclusion
The Hayes decision strongly suggests that loitering, used
as definitional conduct in a criminal statute, is insufficient
to assess liability. Hayes signifies a return to the "elements of
conduct-mens rea and actus reus"46 in vagrancy that here-
tofore have been absent. Requiring the commission of some
overt act would reduce subterfuge arrests and arrests on sus-
picion, resulting in a more equitable application of criminal
justice.
Oklahoma should follow the lead of Illinois which elimi-
nated the vagrancy concept altogether and now imposes sanc-
tions only where there is proof of the commission of specific
criminal acts.47 Prosecution for criminal conduct, rather than
15 In Proctor v. State, 15 Okla. Crim. 338, 176 P. 771 (1918),
a state statute which prohibited the keeping of a place with
the intent or for the purpose of selling, bartering, manu-
facturing, or giving away liquor was held to be a violation
of due process and equal protection. It was determined that
keeping a place, which is not unlawful activity, coupled
with a present intent to violate the law was not an overt
act. The statute itself failed to define a crime; it attempted
to make innocent activity (keeping a place) accompanied
with an unlawful and unexecuted intent to violate the law,
a crime. This w'as beyond the state's police power. The
Court concluded that innocent activity (keeping a place)
connected with an unlawful purpose (intent to sell or barter
the liquor) was not a crime in that the statute failed to
connect such unlawful intent with any overt act. This is
analogous to the loitering for the purpose of type of stat-
ute. The loitering, which is in itself innocent activity, .is
not connected with any overt act.
47 'Id. at 135, nn. 186, 187.
46 Vagrancy Reconsidered, supra note 1, at 118.
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